the Jospin government to explore activist possibilities, and also the accepted limits of such activism .
Globalisation, Social Democracy, and Réalisme de Gauche
The Mitterrand era began in 1981 with an ambitious counter-cyclical demand-boost and a dash for growth in the context of a world slump, termed by Hall, 'redistributive Keynesianism' 2 However, within two years, external pressures, including significantly the conditions of EMS membership, and a series of financial crises undermined this macro-economic stance. Its reversal began as early as June 1982, but the coup de grace was administered in March 1983. 3 The episode was widely interpreted, both within French Socialism and beyond, as a demonstration of the incompatibility of Keynesian social democracy and the new international political economic order of the post-Bretton Woods world.
The 'failure' of the Mitterrand experiment attested to the difficulties social democrats faced in attempting to control their national economic space in the new international political economic context. For some, this meant globalisation had rendered social democracy unworkable. 4 More sober analyses recognised the impact of globalisation to be ambiguous. 5 Globalisation neither 'mandates' nor 'prohibits' policies, but changes the structure of costs and opportunities of particular strategies. The room to manoeuvre for social democratic governments is (and ever was) quite small, but globalisation does not press upon actors irresistible policy formulation. Pierson's account insists upon 'complex interplay and feedback as politicians seek to anticipate markets and market actors seek to second-guess the politicians.' He insists that 'there are still choices to be made -even if these have become more expensive or more difficult to mobilize.' 6 There is real constraint, but also possible opportunity. We need not delve at length into the detail of that 'regime defining' choice of 1983, it has been done admirably elsewhere. 7 However, it should be recalled that the so-called autre politique offered an alternative, rooted in the established referential of French economic policy-making.
That globalisation does not, in any straightforward manner, 'impose' financial discipline or neo-liberal policy agendas on social democratic governments lies at the 3 heart of the political eocnomy of the Jospin government . Jospin asserts, 'we do not give in to the fatalistic idea that the neo-liberal capitalist model is the only one available. On the contrary, we can shape the world according to our values.' 8 Réalisme de Gauche suggests that globalisation does not preclude social democratic policy activism. Globalisation, according to Jospin, 'favours global growth, but is accompanied by growing of inequalities … it liberates energies, but also negative forces which must be mastered.' 9 Regulation is, Jospin argues, the 'political globalisation' required in this new context; 'wherever there is a risk that only the law of the strongest may apply, or where private interests threaten the general interest, or where the search for short term profit undermines social justice and damages the environment, States must define the 'rules of the game'.' 10 Jospin's primary concern is with international financial regulation -where he urges the Bretton-Woods institutions to 'pursue their evolution' towards re-regulation of the international political economy, beginning with closer supervision of hedge funds and off-shore banking centres. Here Jospin repeats oft-cited calls for a Tobin Tax on volatile speculative capital flows, and urges the IMF, of all institutions, to engage in 'reflection' on encouraging greater 'viscosity' in the movement of capital as a source of stability. 11 We could, Jospin notes, 'let the supposedly natural laws of economics guide the evolution of our societies, and in so doing, abdicate our political responsibilities. On the contrary, we could seek to re-orient the forces at work in the globalisation of economic activity.' 12 No prizes for guessing which he favours.
For all the talk of voluntarisme and re-regulation, the 1983 U-turn nevertheless enforced upon French Socialists a recognition of external constraints and reduced room to manoeuvre in an international economic order where the 'embedded liberalism' of the Bretton Woods had ceased to insulate national economies.
Emmanuelli and Chevènement referred to 1983 as 'notre Bad Godesberg'. 13 For all those who experienced at first hand the currency crises provoked by the mismatch between domestic economic priorities and strategy, and international economic context, 1983 was a salutary lesson into the limited nature of economic sovereignty.
The 'realism' and pragmatism which underpins the political economy of the Jospin Government (notably in its 'consolidation' of public finances) is testament to the integration of these 'limits of the possible' into its frame of reference.
Competitive Disinflation
What is most striking about the 1983 U-turn and the subsequent evolution of French The logic of competitive disinflation is simple: 'under fixed exchange rates, a country with higher inflation loses competitiveness, and as a result demand for output falls.
An increase in unemployment follows which makes inflation decrease sufficiently so that competitiveness is eventually re-established.' 14 The strategy was a crucial determinant of all aspects of economic policy from 1983 onwards. Competitive disinflation comprised three elements. First, the nominal stability of the franc fort, pegged to the DM. Second, wage restraint and wage discipline, initially through a deindexation of wages, which aimed to but tackle inflation, and also to shift added value from labour to capital, thereby improving profitability (and investment). The third priority was that of public deficit reduction, aiming to bolster financial credibility. 15 Two aspects of competitive disinflation stand out: its emulation of German model, and the place of financial credibility (and the attendant accommodation to dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy) as its lynch pin. Monetary policy was no longer used as an instrument of reflation, activist fiscal policy was not countenanced, and 'Keynesian' inspired automatic stabilisers were partially 'turned off'. years following the U-turn, which saw structural unemployment rocket. 18 Problems were compounded by the 'asymmetric dependency' of Franco-German economic relations in the post-reunification period. Germany decided to finance reunification through European borrowing, and, accordingly, set very high interest rates, which
French rates were constrained to shadow, discouraging productive investment. This further crippled France's already sluggish growth.
The strategy of competitive disinflation was clearly running counter to the declared justification of long-term job creation. Employment priorities suggested the urgent need for a reduction of interest rates, and a devaluation of the Franc vis-à-vis the Deutschmark. However, employment was so low on the macroeconomic hierarchy of priorities, and the competitive disinflation referential with its attendant sound money ethos was so dominant, that when the Germans proposed a re-alignment of parities within the EMS, revaluing the Mark, Bérégovoy refused. 19 The market medicine was 6 killing the patient. Austerity dampened demand, meanwhile persistent high unemployment produced 'hysteresis' effects, with low activity and slow capital accumulation triggering bankruptcies, and destroying productive capacity. The structural unemployment rate was 'ratcheted' up. This scenario obtained between 1983, when unemployment stood at 8.3 per cent, until 1997, when it exceeded 12.6
per cent: 'The strategy followed has been, quite simply, to achieve disinflation and increased competitiveness through higher unemployment.'
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Shifting the Policy Paradigm: From Pensée Unique to Réalisme de Gauche
Electorally, the manifest failure of a decade of Socialist Government to make any impression on the soaring unemployment figures was devastating. This, acting in tandem with widespread disdain for a sleaze-ridden Socialist elite, heralded the biggest defeat in the history of French Socialism in 1993. 21 The failure of the Bérégovoy government, like those before it, to deliver on its pledge to reduce unemployment led to a re-evaluation of Socialist economic strategy. Too much, it was felt, had been sacrificed at the altar of economic orthodoxy, with resultant gains in financial credibility and profitability, but not jobs.
The set the tone for the message Jospin repeated in his 1995 Presidential manifesto:
'We must learn the lessons of the past, in order to instigate the reorientations of economic policy which today are necessary and possible without increasing public deficit, nor putting our currency, our external balances, or the competitivity of our firms in peril. I reject the idea that the state is powerless, and believe that it should deploy all its capacities to aid job creation.' in order to meet the convergence criteria. 23 In calling for the less restrictive conception of the convergence criteria, 24 Moscovici questions 'the erroneous conviction that the 3% level is an absolute barrier, separating monetary virtue from vice'. 25 A similar approach has subsequently been taken to the Growth and Stability
Pact (see David Howarth's article in this issue)
With the calling into question of competitive disinflation came also the questioning of its theoretical foundations, and the canon from which they are drawn. The Jospin
Government was keen to renew with the influence of economic thought of broadly Keynesian origin within the PS. Although remaining within the framework of a commitment to stability, the advocated strategy has a Keynesian feel to it. Firms must anticipate 'solvent' levels of demand -which presupposes mass consumption, and therefore higher salaries. This explains the commitment to limited redistribution from capital to labour, particularly towards those lower earners with a higher propensity to spend, albeit tempered by an appreciation of the importance of the profitability and competitiveness of firms. Whilst careful to point out that this is not a return to oldstyle Keynesian policies, the different ideological suppositions under-pinning this different view of the economy are explicitly highlighted. 26 The challenging of the dominant economic orthodoxy, and its corollary, the changing diagnosis of the economic problem, inform a particular reading of the implications of globalisation for social democratic economic strategy -Réalisme de Gauche. Jospin rejects 'finding a middle way between social democracy and neo-liberalism'. The idea of capitalism as, 'a force that moves, but does not know where it is going' informs the view that, 'the regulation of capitalism is essential and requires an active state.' 27 The
French state, institutionalising the values of solidarity, co-operation and inclusion should act, it is argued, as a counterweight to the market to promote social cohesion.
Greater efficiency is called for in state redistribution policies, necessitating fundamental reform of the tax system 'to increase social justice, ceasing to privilege capital in order to favour labour, and to preserve solidarity.' 28 Reform to and augmentation of the role of the Contribution Sociale Généralisée (CSG) have been conspicuous mechanisms of the Jospin Government's redistributive agenda. This is part of a wider attempt to shift the logic of welfare funding in France.
The 1998 budget increased the CSG -applied to all earnings and not just wagesfrom 3.4% to 7.5%, and at the same time decreased workers contributions to health insurance from 5.5% to 0.75%. According to Levy, 'although the fiscal yield was unchanged, the reform provided the average worker with a 1.1% gain in purchasing power; conversely it added to the tax bill of those (primarily, the affluent) who derive earnings from property or capital.' 40 
